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10 Comparable Worth in the 
Public Sector 
Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Robert S. Smith 
10.1 Introduction 
Some two decades after the passage of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 
and Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which together prohibit 
(among other things) sex discrimination in wages on any given job and 
sex discrimination in access to employment opportunities, it is still 
common to observe that on average females earn less than males, that 
females are distributed across occupations in a manner quite different 
than males, and that earnings in occupations dominated by females 
tend to be lower than earnings in those dominated by males, even after 
one controls for traditional proxies for productivity (see, for example, 
Treiman and Hartmann 1981). The frustrations generated by these out-
comes have led to pressure for the adoption of the principle of com-
parable worth, a principle that at least one participant in the debate 
has called "the women's issue of the 1980s."1 
In simplest terms, proponents of comparable worth assert that jobs 
within a firm can be valued in terms of the skill, effort, and responsibility 
they require, as well as the working conditions they offer. Two jobs 
would be said to be of comparable worth to a firm if they were com-
parable in terms of these characteristics. The principle of comparable 
worth asserts that within a firm, jobs that are of comparable worth to 
the firm should receive equal compensation. 
While some efforts to implement comparable worth have taken place 
in the private sector, the major push for comparable worth has occurred 
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in the state and local government sector.2 By the mid-1960s over a 
dozen states had passed comparable worth legislation covering state 
employees (table 10.1), although these laws were rarely enforced. Start-
ing with a 1974 state of Washington study, a number of states have 
undertaken formal job evaluation studies to see how their compensation 
systems mesh with the principle of comparable worth (table 10.1).3 In 
several cases, this evaluation has led to "voluntary" implementation 
of comparable worth through the legislative and collective bargaining 
processes (e.g., Minnesota) or to court-ordered implementation (Wash-
ington).4 Table 10.1 summarizes the status of comparable worth initia-
tives in the fifty states and the District of Columbia, as of the summer 
of 1984. By this date, nine states had begun the process of implementing 
some form of comparable worth in their employees' compensation 
systems. 
Comparable worth initiatives have also been undertaken at the local 
level. Table 10.2 presents data on forty-five cities, counties, and school 
districts that either had undertaken a study of the issue, had at least 
one group of employees in litigation over the issue, had passed a local 
ordinance, or were contemplating implementing or had implemented 
comparable worth wage adjustments by the summer of 1984. Many of 
these units were in the states of California, Minnesota, and Washington. 
Comparable worth wage adjustments were implemented in San Jose, 
California, after a well-publicized strike of municipal employees; this 
action undoubtedly influenced the spread to other California units. 
Minnesota passed a law in April 1984 requiring political subdivisions 
to evaluate jobs and then revise their compensation structure in accord 
with comparable worth. Finally, the early Washington comparable worth 
study attracted attention to the issue in that state. 
Given the growing importance of the concept of comparable worth 
in the public sector,5 a theoretical and empirical analysis of some of 
the issues it raises is obviously in order. In section 10.2 we discuss the 
cases for and against comparable worth, from the perspective of an-
alytical labor economists. These cases are discussed in the context of 
simple labor market models, and we stress the key assumptions that 
influence whether the policy might be considered desirable. Ultimately 
we conclude that the debate over comparable worth must involve a 
consideration of the trade-off between efficiency and equity. 
Sections 10.3 and 10.4 ignore the objections to the principle of com-
parable worth and, assuming one wants to implement it, discuss some 
of the conceptual and operational problems involved. Previous studies, 
primarily by non-economists, have addressed many of the problems in 
this area (e.g., the existence of sex bias in describing or evaluating 
jobs, the difficulty of devising evaluation schemes, and the problem of 
rater reliability), so our discussion of these issues will be brief. Rather, 
our focus will be on two issues. 
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Table 10.1 
State 
Alabama* 
Alaska 
Arizona* 
Arkansas 
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
D.C. 
Florida 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Mississippi* 
Missouri 
Montana 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
New York 
North Carolina 
North Dakota 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina 
South Dakota 
Status of Comparable Worth Initiatives in States and the District of 
Columbia, Fall 1984 
Existence of 
a Comparable 
Worth Job 
Evaluation 
Study 
(1) 
Yes, a 
No 
No 
No 
Yes, b 
No 
No 
Yes, c 
No 
Yes, c 
Yes, b 
Yes, b 
No 
Yes, a 
Yes, a 
Yes, b 
Yes, a 
Yes, a, b 
Yes, b 
Yes, a 
Yes, b 
Yes, b 
No 
Yes, b 
Yes, b 
No 
Yes, a 
Yes, b 
Yes, a 
Yes,a 
No 
Yes, b 
Yes, a 
No 
Yes, a 
Yes, b 
Yes, a 
No 
No 
Existence of 
State Legislation 
Relating to 
Comparable 
Worth 
(2) 
Yes, A (1965) 
Yes, A (1949) 
B, 1983 
No 
No 
Yes, A (1983) 
No 
Yes, C (1984) 
Yes, A (1966) 
Yes, A (1981) 
Yes, A (1969) 
Yes, C (1984) 
Yes, D (1984) 
Yes, A (1983) 
No 
Yes, A (1966) 
No 
Yes, A (1954) 
Yes, A (1966) 
Yes, A (1945) 
Yes, A (1962) 
Yes, A (1981) 
E (1984) 
Yes, C (1984) 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes, D (1983) 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes, A (1965) 
Yes, A (1983) 
No 
No 
No 
Yes, A (1966) 
Existence 
of 
Litigation 
(3) 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Implementation 
of 
Comparable 
Worth 
(4) 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes, 1 
No 
. No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes, 4 
No 
No 
Yes, 2 
No 
No 
Yes, 2 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes, 1 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes, 2 
Yes, 2 
No 
No 
Yes, 5 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
246 Ronald G. Ehrenberg/Robert S. Smith 
Table 10.1 (continued) 
State 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Utah 
Vermont 
Virginia 
Washington 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming 
Existence of 
a Comparable 
Worth Job 
Evaluation 
Study 
(1) 
Yes, a 
No 
No 
Yes, b 
Yes, b 
Yes, b 
No 
Yes, a 
No 
Existence of 
State Legislation 
Relating to 
Comparable 
Worth 
(2) 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes, F (1983) 
No 
Yes, A (1965) 
No 
Existence 
of 
Litigation 
(3) 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Implementation 
of 
Comparable 
Worth 
(4) 
Yes, 2 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes, 3 
No 
No 
No 
Source: Author's interpretation of material contained in unpublished tables prepared by 
Alice Cook (Cornell University), based upon responses to questionnaires she mailed in 
November 1983 to state personnel directors, heads of committees on the status of women, 
and public employee union leaders, as well as sources published thereafter. 
Notes: Column (1): a = formal comparable worth job evaluation study is under way; b 
= formal comparable worth job evaluation study was completed; c = tabulation of 
female/male pay differentials by broad occupational classes has been completed; d = 
the state is contemplating a job evaluation study. Column (2): A = state statute that 
mandates equal pay in state employment for jobs of comparable worth exists (year 
adopted); B = state statute that calls for periodic reviews of salaries in job classes 
dominated by women (year adopted); C = legislation introduced (or being drafted) but 
not yet enacted; D = funds appropriated to study the issue; E = law requires political 
subdivisions to do job evaluations and institute salary structure based on comparable 
worth; F = law requires implementation of comparable worth. Column (3): if yes, at 
least one group of state employees is in litigation over the issue. Column (4): 1 = 
implemented, or gearing up to implement, through the collective bargaining process, 
over a number of years; 2 = implemented, or gearing up to implement, through the 
legislative process, over a number of years; 3 = to be implemented through court order; 
4 = implemented by the state, but allows market forces to influence salaries, not really 
comparable worth; 5 = implemented compensation based on a factor point system to 
achieve overall equity, not really considered a comparable worth issue. 
'No response to the questionnaire. 
First, in section 10.3 we address the attempts by various states to 
conduct comparable worth job evaluation studies in which wages are 
related to total job evaluation points; discrimination is then inferred if, 
on average, female-dominated occupations receive lower wages than 
male-dominated occupations with comparable total evaluation points. 
We ask if it is reasonable to simply sum up points over the different 
job evaluation factors (e.g., training, job responsibility, working con-
ditions) to get a total score for each job, to which wages are then related. 
This procedure assumes that employers "value!' an additional point 
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Table 10.2 Comparable Worth Initiatives in Selected Local Governments as of 
Summer 1984 
Cities Counties School Districts 
Phoenix, Ariz. (1)(3) 
Berkeley, Calif. (3) 
Fresno, Calif. (1) 
Los Angeles, Calif. (2) 
Mountain View Calif. (1) 
Palo Alto, Calif. (2) 
San Francisco, Calif. (1) 
San Jose, Calif. (1)(4) 
Santa Cruz, Calif. (1)(3) 
S. Lake Tahoe, Calif. (1) 
Colorado Springs, Colo. (1)(3) 
Minneapolis, Minn. (1) 
St. Paul, Minn. (1) 
Portland, Oreg. (1) 
Philadelphia, Pa. (2) 
Virginia Beach, Va. (1)(3) 
Olympia, Wash. (1) 
Renton, Wash., (1)(3) 
Seattle, Wash. (1) 
Spokane, Wash. (1)(3) 
Madison, Wis. (1) 
Alameda, Calif. (1) 
Contra Costa, Calif. 
(D(3) 
Humboldt, Calif. (1)(3) 
Santa Clara, Calif. 
(1)(2)(3) 
San Mateo, Calif. (3) 
Sonoma, Calif. (1) 
Hennepin, Minn. (1) 
Nassau, N.Y. (1)(2) 
Fairfax, Va. (2) 
King, Wash. (3) 
Pierce, Wash. (1)(3) 
Thurston, Wash. (1) 
Dane, Wis. (1) 
Tucson, Ariz. (1) 
Carlsbad, Calif. (1)(3) 
Chico, Calif. (1)(3) 
Los Angeles, Calif. (1)(2) 
Manhattan Beach, Calif. (1) 
Pittsburgh, Calif. (1)(4) 
Sacramento, Calif. (3) 
Vacaville, Calif. (3) 
Anoka Hennepin, Minn. (2) 
Minneapolis, Minn. (1) 
Woodland Hills 
(Pittsburgh, Pa.) (3) 
Source: See table 10.1. 
Notes: (1) = "comparable worth" job evaluation study underway or completed; (2) = 
at least one group of employees is in litigation over the issue; (3) = comparable worth 
wage adjustments contemplated or implemented; (4) = comparable worth wage adjust-
ments implemented after a strike. 
of each factor equally. Taking a hedonic wage equation approach, we 
use data from job evaluation studies conducted in the states of Min-
nesota, Washington, and Connecticut to estimate empirically if the 
weights these states actually assign to each factor are equal and, if not, 
how this affects estimates of male-female comparable worth gaps. We 
also test in this section whether functional form assumptions affect 
these estimates. 
Total compensation on a job includes opportunities for occupational 
mobility and subsequent wage growth. The above-mentioned state 
studies ignore these factors, implicitly assuming that male/female cur-
rent wage differentials for given job evaluation point scores are not 
compensated for by opportunities for wage growth. To test this as-
sumption would require longitudinal earnings data for male and female 
public employees whose initial job evaluation scores are equal. While 
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such data are unavailable, section 10.4 uses data on state and local 
government employees in New York State from the 1/100 sample of 
the 1970 Census of Population to illustrate how one might indirectly 
test this assumption. These data permit us to identify individuals' in-
dustry and occupation of employment in both 1965 and 1970, as well 
as their 1969 earnings levels. Mean earnings by three-digit public sector 
occupation in New York State are constructed from these data and 
used to obtain estimates of male/female public sector differentials in 
occupational mobility in the state. 
Section 10.5 switches to a different issue: some of the unanticipated 
(by proponents) side effects of implementing comparable worth in the 
public sector. Comparable worth wage adjustments (henceforth CWWA) 
would likely alter at least four types of relative prices that public em-
ployers face. First, for any given function (e.g., police) and within any 
major occupational group (e.g., clerical) the average wage_of_female 
employees would rise relative to the average wage of male employees, 
as""some female employees received CWWA. Second, for any given 
function, across major occupational groups, the average wage of em-
ployees in heavily "female" occupations (e.g., clerical) would rise 
relative to the average wages of employees in heavily "male" (e.g., 
crafts) occupations, as more employees in the former would receive 
CWWA. Third, across functions, the average wage in heavily female-
dominated functions (e.g., elementary education) would rise relative 
to the average wage in heavily male-dominated functions (e.g., fire 
fighters), as employees in the former would again be more likely to 
receive CWWA. Finally, holding constant the existing distribution of 
public employees, the average_wage of public employees would rise 
relative to the prices of other goods and services. 
It is natural to ask how such relative wage changes would affect the 
composition of public employment. To the extent that public employ-
ers1 employment decisions are sensitive to their employees' wage rates, 
one would expect to observe the four sets of relative wage changes 
leading respectively to the substitution of some male for some female 
employees within a function-occupation group, the substitution of some 
employment in male-dominated occupations for some employment in 
female-dominated occupations (within a function), the substitution of 
some employment in male-dominated functions for some employment 
in female-dominated functions, and a decline in the aggregate level of 
public employment. For all these reasons, CWWA might be expected 
to lead to a decline in female employment. 
Section 10.5 provides estimates of the extent to which some of these 
types of adjustments might occur in the state and local sector. Existing 
estimates of the demand for labor in the public sector are supplemented 
by new estimates of the determinants of male/female and occupational 
249 Comparable Worth in the Public Sector 
employment ratios, obtained from 1970 and 1980 Census of Population 
data. Based upon these estimates, a crude simulation of the potential 
effects of CWWA on female employment in the public sector is pre-
sented. Finally, section 10.6 summarizes our findings and presents some 
brief concluding remarks. 
10.2 The Cases for and against Comparable Worth 
Consider the simplest possible stylized competitive labor market 
model.6 In a competitive labor market a firm hires employees in an 
occupation or job category until the category's marginal product equals 
its real wage. A category's marginal product represents its "worth" 
to an employer. However, this worth is not necessarily fixed over time, 
but rather depends upon the number of employees hired in the category 
and all other job categories, the quantity of capital available to em-
ployees to work with, the production technology, and the quality of 
employees in the various job categories. The worth of a job then cannot 
be determined independent of the qualifications of its incumbents and 
may well change over time. This statement suggests that job evaluation 
surveys cannot be a one-shot event, but rather must be constantly 
updated; the worth of a job to an employer is not necessarily constant 
over time.7 
Now move to the level of the labor market as a whole. The aggre-
gation of individual firms' demand curves for each occupation leads to 
market demand curves for the occupation. The supply of labor to each 
occupation/job category will depend upon workers' qualifications, the 
pecuniary and nonpecuniary forms of compensation every job offers, 
and the distribution of preferences across workers for the various jobs. 
If there are no barriers to occupational mobility, a worker will move 
between jobs until the "net advantage" he or she perceives from each 
is equalized. Such movements lead to an equilibrating structure of 
occupational wage differentials; this structure depends upon the dis-
tribution of workers' qualifications and "tastes" for the various jobs. 
In this stylized competitive world, all of the factors that comparable 
worth advocates believe should affect wages (skill, effort, responsi-
bility, and working conditions) would affect wages, since these factors 
would influence the underlying demand and supply schedules. How-
ever, the weight the market would place on each factor in determining 
wages would reflect the entire distribution of employees' tastes for, 
and employers' valuation of, each factor, not the weight assigned by 
a job evaluation scheme. 
If in such a world females clustered into lower-paying occupations 
than males who had comparable productivity-related characteristics 
(e.g., education), this arrangement would reflect only systematic dif-
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ferences in tastes between males and females for the nonpecuniary 
characteristics offered by the various jobs. For example, married fe-
males with children might have strong preferences for jobs that do not 
require travel, long hours, or work that must be brought home in the 
evenings. Given their preferences, males and females would have made 
optimal career choices and no government intervention would be 
required. 
Of course this conclusion presupposes the validity of the assumptions 
of the model, a number of which proponents of comparable worth 
seriously challenge. The first is the assumption that there are no barriers 
to occupational mobility. If women are systematically excluded from 
high-paying occupations, one cannot claim that the structure of earn-
ings is the result of voluntary choice. A market economist would re-
spond that an appropriate long-run remedy in this case would be to 
break down occupational barriers through actions including rigorous 
enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. However, such actions 
would provide only for gradual improvement of the welfare of the 
discriminated-against group because they would have to wait for va-
cancies to occur in the higher-paying male jobs. In addition, for jobs 
that require training, this policy would benefit primarily new entrants 
whose time horizons are sufficiently long to enable them to profitably 
undertake the necessary training. 
In the absence of a policy that could (1) create "male" jobs for all 
qualified females who want them, (2) identify the older women who 
historic discrimination prevented from making different occupational 
choices early in their lives and who now could not afford to profitably 
undertake the necessary investment if the barriers to entry were bro-
ken, and (3) provide resources to these women now so that they could 
undertake the training, it could be argued that a policy calling for 
comparable worth might make sense. Its justification would be based 
on equity considerations; one would have to conclude that these would 
outweigh any efficiency losses that might result. The latter include any 
decreased female employment caused by the increased wages in these 
female occupations (see section 10.5).8 
The second assumption challenged is that wages in female-dominated 
occupations are determined in competitive markets. There is consid-
erable evidence that employers in some female-dominated occupations, 
such as public school teaching and hospital nursing, appear to have 
monopsony power.9 As is well known, in this circumstance there is a 
range over which one can "legislate" a higher wage without suffering 
any employment loss. Whether the wage that would be set under a 
comparable worth wage policy would fall in such a range cannot be 
determined a priori, and in any case the vast majority of females are 
not employed in these occupations. A remedy insuring that employers 
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in these markets actively compete for workers might make more sense 
than comparable worth.10 
The case for comparable worth thus seems to rest on the argument 
that the current occupational distribution of female employees is based 
on discriminatory barriers that existing legislation has not broken down. 
Even if one could enforce these laws, breaking down barriers does not 
help experienced older workers who have invested heavily in occu-
pation-specific training and whose time horizon is now too short to 
profitably undertake new occupational investments. Comparable worth 
is one of several policies that could provide a remedy for these workers.n 
Whether it is a desirable policy depends upon one's perceptions of how 
the benefits it provides contrast with the efficiency losses it induces. 
Just as with one's perception about the value of the minimum wage, 
given the trade-offs involved, ultimately one's position on comparable 
worth must depend on value judgments. 
10.3 Comparable Worth Job Evaluation Studies 
Suppose one ignores the objections to comparable worth posed by 
economists and decides that a governmental unit's compensation struc-
ture should be determined solely by this principle. The first task one 
would face would be to devise a job evaluation scheme to measure the 
worth of each job. Numerous evaluation schemes currently exist, but 
a host of problems make the schemes less than satisfactory for use in 
a comparable worth study.12 Others have discussed these problems, 
which include possible sex biases in the description of jobs, the eval-
uation of jobs, and the determination of which job characteristics should 
be valued; the statistical reliability of rater's evaluations; and the cor-
relation of job ratings (or the lack of such) across different evaluation 
schemes (see Treiman and Hartmann 1981; Schwab 1984). Nonetheless, 
as table 10.1 indicates, several states have already conducted formal 
job evaluation studies and used them to draw conclusions about whether 
their female employees are underpaid relative to their male employees 
whose jobs are evaluated to be of comparable worth. 
The typical study used is based upon the factor point method (Trei-
man 1979). The characteristics of jobs are described and then a rater, 
or group of raters, assigns point scores to each job on a number of 
dimensions. In the widely used Hay Point System developed by Hay 
Associates, these dimensions include know-how, problem solving, ac-
countability, and working conditions.13 The points a job receives for 
each category are summed to get a total score, or measure of worth, 
for the job. The magnitudes of the wage adjustments required by a 
comparable worth policy are obtained by either directly computing how 
much less each female-dominated job pays than male-dominated jobs 
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with the same total point score, or by estimating a wage equation in 
which male-dominated jobs' wages are specified to be a function only 
of their total point scores and then computing by how much wages in 
female-dominated jobs lie below this estimated equation. 
This methodology raises two issues: First, how sensitive are the 
estimates of the individual occupational "comparable worth gaps," and 
the average gap across occupations, to different functional form as-
sumptions about the male wage equation. If functional form assump-
tions influence the results, careful consideration must be given to func-
tional form and methods to "statistically" choose the correct form 
used (see Box and Cox 1964, for example). 
Second, is it reasonable to sum the individual factor point scores to 
get a total score? To do so implies that the marginal value a govern-
mental unit gets from an additional point is the same across factors. A 
more general approach would be to estimate hedonic wage equations 
in which the wage in a male-dominated occupation was specified to be 
a function of the individual factor point scores in the occupation; the 
resulting regression coefficients would be estimates of the marginal 
value the government unit placed on an additional point on each factor. 
If the marginal effects of factor points on salaries differ across factors 
and if male and female jobs with the same total factor point scores 
have a different distribution of individual factor point scores, then 
basing comparable worth gap estimates solely on total Hay points may 
lead to erroneous conclusions.14 
This section uses data from job evaluation studies conducted in Min-
nesota, Washington, and Connecticut to see how robust these studies' 
results are to these modifications. Our calculations are meant to be 
illustrative; the specific estimates we obtain of comparable worth gaps 
may differ from those the studies themselves found because of differ-
ences in the samples we use and the functional form assumptions we 
make. 
10.3.1 Minnesota 
Minnesota is one of the few states that has actually begun to imple-
ment comparable worth pay adjustments for its employees. A Council 
on the Economic Status of Women that had been monitoring the status 
of state-employed women since 1976 found in 1981 that state job clas-
sifications remained heavily segregated by sex, that female employees 
tended to be overrepresented in low-paying clerical or service occu-
pations, and that the gap between average earnings of state-employed 
males and females was almost $5,000. This led the council to establish 
a Task Force on Pay Equity to examine salary differences between 
male and female jobs. 
The state of Minnesota, in conjunction with Hay Associates, had 
begun in 1979 an evaluation of all state government jobs. Each position 
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was awarded Hay points in the four areas previously mentioned, as 
well as a total Hay,point score. These evaluations were used by the 
task force, which conducted analyses of the maximum monthly salary 
for 188 positions in which at least ten employees were employed and 
which could be classified as either male (at least 70 percent male in-
cumbents) or female (at least 70 percent female incumbents) positions. 
These analyses were primarily visual inspections of scattergrams; they 
concluded that in almost every case with equal total Hay point scores 
(see Council on the Economic Status of Women 1982), the pay for 
female jobs was less than the pay for male jobs. In most cases, female 
jobs also received lower pay than male jobs with lower Hay point totals. 
Estimates of the cost of implementing pay equity, by raising salaries 
in each of the female-dominated classes to the lowest (highest) salary 
of a male-dominated class with the same number of Hay points (or the 
next-lowest-rated male job when no male job with the same number 
of points existed) were calculated as ranging from 2 percent to 4 percent 
of the total salary base, or $20 million to $40 million. 
Salaries of state employees in Minnesota are determined, for the 
most part, through collective bargaining. After reviewing these find-
ings, and conducting some analyses of their own, the state of Minnesota 
appropriated a total of $22 million and distributed this sum among the 
various bargaining units, in proportion to their payrolls in the female-
dominated classes.15 Each unit then bargained with the state over which 
specific occupation titles would receive comparable worth wage ad-
justments from these funds. The adjustments were paid in two stages 
(over $7 million in July 1983 and over $14 million in July 1984). Although 
in practice only the "female-dominated" occupations have received 
such adjustments, nothing in the law restricts comparable worth ad-
justments to these classes. The law requires that reanalyses and reeval-
uations of the need for additional comparable worth adjustments be 
undertaken every two years, and a commitment has been made to fund 
additional adjustments during the 1985-87 period. 
The data from Minnesota are a convenient place for us to start, both 
because the Hay point system is one of the (if not the) most widely 
used job evaluation systems in the country and because Minnesota has 
already begun to implement comparable worth adjustments based par-
tially on the original study. We obtained data from the original study, 
as of October 1981, for 188 job titles, on the number of incumbents 
(«,-), the percentage female (FEM,), the total Hay Point Score {HPT}) 
and the maximum monthly salary for the class (S,-).16 The state of 
Minnesota Department of Employee Relations also provided us with 
a computer printout that listed, as of November 1983, the individual 
factor point scores (know-how, HPlf, problem solving HP2c, account-
ability, HP3j-, and working conditions, HPAi) for every state occupation 
title (Minnesota, Department of Employee Relations 1983). Of the 188 
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job titles in the original study, we were able to match factor job point 
scores to 150 job titles, and this subset of job titles became the sample 
we used in our analysis.17 
Table 10.3 presents some descriptive statistics from the factor point 
score data that highlight a number of points. First, on average, male 
jobs were more highly rated than female jobs. Second, average point 
scores and the range of variation of point scores for the first three 
factors far exceed the comparable variables for the fourth factor (work-
ing conditions). Indeed, the small range of variation in this factor, the 
large number of observations that have zero scores for it, and its small 
maximum value in the sample of 29, as compared to a maximum of 
400 for know-how points, reinforces the notion that one cannot simply 
add all factor point scores together to get a total score.18 Third, focusing 
on the individual factor point scores as a share of total Hay points, 
there are differences by sex; female jobs rank relatively high on the 
first (know-how) factor and relatively low on all other factors. 
Finally, and perhaps most important, in these Minnesota data there 
actually are not four truly independent job factors.19 The bottom panel 
of table 10.3 presents a correlation matrix of the individual factor point 
scores and the total Hay Point Score; it is striking that the correlations 
among the first three factors' scores and between each of them and the 
total scores all exceed .94. Only the relatively unimportant (in mag-
nitude) working condition score is at all orthogonal to, or relatively 
uncorrected with, the other factor scores. These results suggest that 
with these Minnesota data it will be difficult to disentangle the marginal 
effects on wages of individual factor points and that wage equations 
using the total factor point scores as the sole explanatory variable are 
unlikely to yield results very different from those that use the individual 
factor point scores. 
These conjectures are borne out in tables 10.4 and 10.5. Table 10.4 
presents estimates separately for the male and female occupations of 
monthly maximum occupational salary equations of the form 
(1) S, = a0 + atfPTi + e,; 
(2) Si = B0 + B.HPli + B2HP2i + B3HP3t + B^HPA, + e,; 
(3) S, =
 7o + 1xHPAt + ^HPSt + €, 
(HP5i = HP\i + HP2{ + HP3,). 
Here e, is a random error term, and we have progressively regressed 
monthly salaries on total Hay points, the four individual factor point 
scores, and the fourth factor point score plus the sum of the first three. 
To see whether the results are sensitive to functional form assumptions, 
a second set of estimates in table 10.4 (equations 4-6) use the logarithm 
liable 10.3 Descriptive Statistics, Minnesota Data 
Male Jobs (N = 102) Female Jobs (N = 48) 
HP1 
HP2 
HP3 
HP4 
HP1F 
HP2F 
HP3F 
HP4F 
Mean 
168.7 
50.9 
60.7 
5.4 
.608 
.164 
.197 
.030 
(Std. Dev.) 
(63.3) 
(33.5) 
(41.0) 
( 7.2) 
( -043) 
( .036) 
( .039) 
( -041) 
Min. 
76 
10 
16 
0 
Max 
400 
200 
264 
29 
Mean 
118.8 
27.6 
32.7 
1.4 
.677 
.141 
.171 
.010 
(Std. Dev.) 
(40.3) 
(18.1) 
(20.1) 
( 3.4) 
( .052) 
( .030) 
( .027) 
( .026) 
Min. 
66 
8 
12 
0 
Max. 
230 
87 
100 
14 
Correlation Matrices 
Male Jobs Female Jobs 
HP1 
HP2 
HP3 
HP4 
HPT 
HP1 
1.00 
.98 
.94 
- . 6 0 
.99 
HP2 
1.00 
.97 
- . 5 8 
.99 
HP3 
1.00 
- . 5 2 
.98 
HP4 
1.00 
- . 5 5 
HP1 
1.00 
.99 
.97 
- . 2 4 
.99 
HP2 
1.00 
.97 
- . 2 1 
.99 
HP3 
1.00 
- . 1 9 
.98 
HP4 
1.00 
- . 1 8 
Sources: Authors' calculations from data in Council on the Economic Status of Women 1982; Minnesota, 
Department of Employee Relations 1983. 
Notes: HP1 = know how points; HP2 = Problem-solving points; HP3 = accountability points; HP4 = 
working condition points; HPT = total Hay points; HPJF = share of category J points in total Hay points. 
Table 10.4 Estimated Comparable Worth Salary Equations, Minnesota Data (absolute value t = statistics) 
Explanatory 
Variables (1) 
Male equations (N = 102) 
C 
HPT 
HPl 
HP2 
HP3 
HP4 
HP5 
PEM 
R2 
1012.06 (40.7) 
3.27 (25.3) 
.865 
Female equations (N = 48) 
C 
HPT 
HPl 
HP2 
HP3 
HP4 
HP5 
PEM 
& 
732.60 (36.2) 
3.50 (33.8) 
.962 
Monthly Maximum Salary 
(la) 
1019.03 (39.6) 
3.38 (25.6) 
-7 .08 (2.7) 
.873 
883.87 (10.5) 
3.47(34.1) 
-1 .61 (1.8) 
.964 
(2) 
803.33 (6.0) 
5.75 (3.6) 
2.47 (0.6) 
0.30 (0.2) 
5.56(1.9) 
.874 
669.68 (7.5) 
4.61 (3.0) 
3.52 (1.0) 
1.29(0.7) 
5.51 (2.2) 
.963 
(3) 
1009.49 
3.463 (1.1) 
3.278(21.1) 
.865 
729.09 (33.9) 
4.76 (2.0) 
3.51 (33.1) 
.961 
(4) 
710.443 (320.4) 
.155 (22.0) 
.829 
677.680 (408.3) 
.235 (27.7) 
.944 
Log of Monthly Maximum Salary8 
(4a) 
710.797 (327.7) 
.161 (22.7) 
- .359 (2.4) 
.839 
691.921 (101.0) 
.232 (28.1) 
- .152 (2.1) 
.948 
(5) 
685.388 (101.2) 
.491 (6.0) 
- .328 (1.6) 
.037 (0.4) 
.194 (1.3) 
.863 
660.206 (96.7) 
.538 (4.7) 
- .161 (0.6) 
- .012 (0.1) 
.516 (2.7) 
.953 
(6) 
712.187 (230.8) 
.026 (0.2) 
.151 (17.9) 
.830 
677.293 (385.5) 
.373 (1.90) 
.235 (27.2) 
.945 
Notes: C = intercept; HPT = total Hay points; HPl = know-how points; HP2 = problem-solving points; HP3 = accountability points; HP4 
working condition points; HP5 = HPl + HP2 + HP3; PEM = percent female employees. 
a. All coefficients in log salary equations have been multiplied by 100. 
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Table 10.5 Estimates of Percentage of Comparable Worth Gap for Minnesota 
Data, Using Alternative Estimation Methods 
£>, D2 £>3 D4 D5 D6 
Mean percentage gap -16 .8 -18.5 -14 .6 -16.1 -16.7 -20 .0 
Correlation of 
differentials across 48 
female job classes 
D, .97 .93 .98 .99 .97 
D2 .82 .94 .97 .99 
D3 .93 .93 .81 
D4 .98 .95 
D5 .97 
Notes: Differentials are computed for each female job class using Hay Point Score for 
the class and the coefficients from the male wage equations in table 10.4. D\ uses equation 
(1); D2 uses equation (4); D3 uses equation (2); D4 uses equation (5); Z)5 uses equation 
(3); D6 uses equation (6). 
of monthly salary as the dependent variable; this is obviously only one 
of many nonlinear functional forms with which one might experiment. 
Because of the severe collinearity problems, the results in table 10.4 
should not be stressed too heavily. They do suggest, however, that the 
implicit weights assigned to individual factor point scores by the col-
lective bargaining process differ across factors. For example, columns 
(2) and (5) suggest that only the first and last factor point scores sig-
nificantly affect wages.20 
What are the magnitudes of the comparable wage gaps implied by 
the various estimates. That is, how sensitive are estimates of compa-
rable wage gaps to the functional form used and to whether individual 
factor point scores or total Hay Point Scores are used in the analysis. 
For each female occupation, we can compute what the occupation 
would have been paid if it had been paid according to a given male 
wage equation. The resulting percentage underpayment figures weighted 
by the number of employees in the occupation can then be aggregated 
across occupations to come up with a mean (over the female occu-
pations) comparable worth wage gap estimate. 
These estimates are presented in the top row of table 10.5 for six 
specifications of the male wage equation; they vary between -14.6 
percent and —20.0 percent, a range that might be considered suffi-
ciently narrow to be useful for public policy. Moreover, as the bottom 
rows of the table suggest, the relative ranking of which female occu-
pations are the most underpaid appears to be insensitive to the esti-
mation method used. The correlation across female occupations of the 
various estimated wage gaps is at least .81. Thus, the various methods 
yield very similar estimates about which of the female occupational 
classes should receive the largest comparable worth adjustments. 
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In sum, the estimates of comparable worth gaps implied by the Min-
nesota data were relatively insensitive to the functional forms used and 
to the use of individual factor point scores instead of total Hay points. 
As we shall see, this result is also characteristic of the other two data 
bases we examine in this section. Because the results for the three 
states are so similar, our discussions of the Washington and Connecticut 
data are relatively brief. 
10.3.2 Washington 
Washington was the first state to undertake a formal factor point job 
evaluation study,21 with the explicit objective of comparing salaries on 
male-dominated (more than 70 percent male) and female-dominated 
(more than 70 percent female) jobs. The study was conducted in 1974 
by the Willis consulting firm and covered 121 job classifications. Its 
major conclusion was that female-dominated jobs tended to pay some 
20 percent less than comparable-valued male jobs. The study was up-
dated in 1976 and additional job categories surveyed. The failure of the 
governor and state legislature to implement the type of wage adjust-
ments called for by the study led to the litigation that resulted in a 
December 1983 federal district court order mandating implementation 
of these adjustments (AFSCME v. State of Washington). This decision 
was reversed by a federal appeals court, but the parties agreed through 
collective bargaining to implement comparable worth wage adjustments 
beginning in 1986. 
The Willis job evaluation system is similar to the Hay system and 
awards points to jobs on the dimensions knowledge and skill, mental 
demands, accountability, and working conditions.22 Table 10.6 contains 
descriptive statistics from the factor point scores for the 121 occupa-
tions in the original Willis study. While in this sample female-dominated 
jobs tend to have higher ratings than male jobs, most other patterns 
are similar to those found in the Minnesota data. Again, the fourth 
factor (working conditions) has a very small range of variation relative 
to the other factors and the other three factors are very highly corre-
lated. So, as with the Minnesota data, there are really only two inde-
pendent dimensions of jobs actually being evaluated by the Willis sys-
tem, and one, working conditions, is obviously measured with 
considerable error. 
Table 10.7 contains estimates of minimum salary equations similar 
to those presented earlier for Minnesota.23 Maximum salary and mid-
point of the occupation's salary range were also available to us; because 
similar results were obtained when they were used as the dependent 
variable, these equations are omitted for brevity. Based upon these 
estimates and those in table 10.7, along with the factor point scores of 
259 Comparable Worth in the Public Sector 
Table 10.6 Descriptive Statistics, Washington Data 
Male (N = 63) Female (N = 58) 
WIL1 
WIL2 
WIL3 
WIL4 
WIL1F 
WIL2F 
WIL3F 
WIL4F 
Mean 
115.0 
32.7 
38.8 
8.7 
.610 
.150 
.180 
.059 
Std. Dev. 
46.7 
24.1 
28.9 
5.2 
Min. 
61.0 
8.0 
11.0 
0.0 
Max. 
244.0 
106.0 
140.0 
20.0 
Mean 
143.8 
42.8 
49.5 
4.4 
.616 
.165 
.194 
.024 
Std. Dev. 
59.1 
34.0 
37.1 
5.4 
Min. 
61.0 
8.0 
11.0 
0.0 
Max. 
280.0 
140.0 
160.0 
17.0 
Correlation Matrices 
Male Jobs 
WIL1 
WIL2 
WIL3 
WIL4 
WILT 
WIL1 
WIL2 
WIL3 
WIL4 
WILT 
WIL1 
1.0 
.98 
.96 
- . 4 8 
.99 
WIL1 
1.0 
.99 
.95 
- . 0 7 
.99 
WIL2 
1.0 
.96 
- . 4 9 
.99 
WIL2 
1.0 
.94 
- . 0 9 
.99 
WIL3 
1.0 
- . 4 3 
.98 
Female Jobs 
WIL3 
1.0 
- . 1 1 
.97 
WIL4 
1.0 
- . 4 3 
WIL4 
1.0 
- . 0 5 
WILT 
1.0 
WILT 
1.0 
Source: Authors' calculations from data in Norman D. Willis and Associates 1976 and 
private correspondence from Helen Remick (Feb. 3, 1984) indicating which occupations 
were male (or female) dominated. 
Notes: WIL1 = knowledge and skill points; WIL2 = mental demands points; WIL3 = 
accountability points; WIL4 = working condition points; WILT = total Willis points; 
WILJF = share of category J points in total Willis points. 
the female occupations, one can compute a set of estimated comparable 
worth gaps for each occupation as before. 
Estimates of the unweighted mean percentage wage gaps are found 
in table 10.8.24 The range is even narrower here than it was in the 
Minnesota data, varying from 21.9 percent to 23.1 percent when the 
minimum salary data are used. Moreover, the correlation across esti-
mation methods of the estimated individual female occupational gaps 
is again very high, exceeding .89 in all cases. The estimated comparable 
Table 10.7 Estimated Comparable Worth Minimum Salary Equations, Washington Data (absolute value t-statistics) 
Explanatory 
Variables (1) 
Male equations (N = 63) 
C 
WILT 
WIL1 
WIL2 
WIL3 
WIL4 
WIL5 
R2 
443.35 (14.2) 
1.57 (10.9) 
.662 
Female equations (N = 58) 
C 
WILT 
WIL1 
WIL2 
WIL3 
WIL4 
WIL5 
R2 
352.82 (16.1) 
1.26(15.1) 
.804 
Minimum Salary 
(2) 
462.76 (4.7) 
.91 (0.6) 
7.29 (2.2) 
-2 .05 (1.2) 
2.80 (.93) 
.693 
252.60 (3.6) 
3.32 (2.9) 
-1 .37 (0.8) 
.33 (0.4) 
-2.96(2.0) 
.826 
(3) 
447.01 (8.9) 
1.29 (0.4) 
1.57 (9.8) 
.662 
370.46 (15.8) 
-2 .37 (1.2) 
1.25(15.4) 
.815 
(4) 
621.67(151.0) 
.193 (10.2) 
.629 
602.64 (198.4) 
.177(15.4) 
.809 
Log of Minimum Salary3 
(5) 
620.92 (47.5) 
.152(0.7) 
.761 (1.7) 
- . 203( -0 .9 ) 
.431 (1.1) 
.651 
582.36 (62.7) 
.576 (3.8) 
- .338 (1.4) 
.003 (0.0) 
- .469(1.8) 
.842 
(6) 
620.68 (93.8) 
.269 (0.7) 
.194 (9.2) 
.629 
605.22 (187.0) 
- .356 (1.3) 
.176(15.7) 
.821 
Sources: Norman D. Williams and Associates 1976; Washington, Department of Personnel 1974; private correspondence from Helen 
Remick (Feb. 3, 1984). 
Notes: C = intercept; WILT = total Willis points; WIL1 = knowledge and skill points; WIL2 = mental demand points; WIL3 
= accountability points; WIL4 = working condition points; WIL5 = WIL1 + WIL2 + WIL3. 
aAll coefficients in log salary equations have been multiplied by 100. 
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Table 10.8 Estimates of the Unweighted Mean Percentage Comparable Worth 
Gap for Washington Data, Alternative Estimation Methods 
Mean Percentage Gaps 
(A) (B) (C) 
Method 
Dt 
D2 
D3 
D4 
D5 
D6 
Minimum Salary 
23.1 
21.9 
22.5 
22.8 
21.9 
22.2 
Maximum Salary 
22.5 
22.7 
22.8 
22.5 
22.9 
23.0 
Midpoint Salary 
23.2 
23.6 
23.7 
22.3 
22.8 
23.9 
Correlation Matrix of Wage Gap Estimates 
£>i D2 Di DA D5 D6 
D, .95 .96 .96 .89 .90 
D2 .98 .92 .95 .95 
£>3 .92 .92 .95 
D4 .95 .96 
D5 .99 
Notes: The differentials at the minimum salary level are computed for each female job 
class in method Dj (j = 1 to 6) using the Willis Point Scores for the class and the 
coefficients from the male wage equations in column j of table 10.7. Analogous com-
putations are done for the maximum and midpoint salary levels using coefficients from 
male maximum and midpoint salary level equations, which are specified similarly to 
those in table 10.7. 
worth gaps are again relatively insensitive to the functional form and 
the decomposition of the factor point scores used. 
10.3.3 Connecticut 
At the directive of the state legislature, Willis Associates was hired 
to undertake a pilot job evaluation study of some 120 state occupations 
in 1979-80.25 The study covered male-dominated, female-dominated, 
and mixed (30 percent to 70 percent male) occupations and was similar 
to the one Willis conducted for Washington. It concluded that female-
dominated jobs were paid some 10 percent to 20 percent less than male 
jobs with comparable levels of Willis points in the sample. 
Based upon this and subsequent students, a decision was made to 
undertake a comprehensive evaluation of all state positions. The re-
sulting job evaluation data will be provided to state employee unions, 
which can use it in future negotiations over wage scales. Although the 
state may consider comparable worth in framing its bargaining position, 
it will continue to consider a number of additional criteria, including 
market conditions. As of 1983 the comprehensive evaluation had not 
yet been completed, but the state had already agreed (in negotiations 
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with three unions whose members were primarily females) to set aside 
1 percent to 2 percent of payroll per year into a fund that would even-
tually be used to finance individual inequity adjustments. 
Tables 10.9, 10.10, and 10.11 provide estimates similar to those ob-
tained for the other states, using data from the Willis study for eighty-
four occupations that were either male or female dominated. The de-
scriptive statistics in table 10.9 confirm by now familiar patterns; little 
variation in working condition points relative to other factors, differ-
ential weighting by sex of the importance of the different factors in the 
total score, and the extremely high correlation of the first three factors. 
The latter again suggests there are only two real factors—working 
conditions and everything else. 
Table 10.10 presents estimates of male and female average annual 
salary equations.26 These estimates strongly suggest (at least for males) 
that different weights should be applied to the different factors; indeed, 
working conditions receives a negative weight in the male equations.27 
Based upon these estimates, one can again estimate the mean com-
parable worth gap generated by each method, as well as the correlation 
of the gap estimates for individual occupations across methods; these 
are found in table 10.11. The mean percentage gap estimate ranges 
between 15.4 percent and 20.2 percent, which is broader than the Wash-
ington range but about the same range as found in the Minnesota data. 
The correlation of the individual occupational wage gap estimates across 
estimation methods, although high, is not as high as before; for these 
data we observe correlations as low as .73. 
10.3.4 Summary 
In sum, our analyses of data from the Minnesota, Washington, and 
Connecticut comparable worth job evaluation studies suggest that in 
these three cases estimates of the average differential, or the ranking 
of differentials across occupations, are not very sensitive to which 
functional form was used or whether total job points are decomposed 
into their individual factor point scores. While these results should be 
gratifying to proponents of comparable worth, we stress that they hold 
for particular samples of data. It is incumbent upon future studies of 
other governmental units to perform sensitivity analyses of the type 
we have undertaken here.28 
10.4 Occupational Mobility 
Total compensation on a job includes both pecuniary and nonpecu-
niary forms of compensation. The previously mentioned studies focus 
on wages and working conditions—the latter obviously poorly mea-
sured by the various evaluation systems. Fringe, benefits tend to be 
Table 10.9 Descriptive Statistics, Connecticut Data 
WILl 
WIL2 
WIL3 
WIL4 
WILT 
WIL1F 
WIL2F 
WIL3F 
WIL4F 
WILl 
WIL2 
WIL3 
WIL4 
WILT 
Mean 
118.16 
32.37 
42.14 
8.19 
200.88 
.603 
.150 
.200 
.047 
WILl 
1.00 
.95 
.95 
- . 2 0 
.98 
Male (N 
Std. Dev. 
32.05 
17.60 
20.11 
6.03 
67.74 
= 43) 
Min. 
61.0 
8.0 
11.0 
0.0 
91.0 
Male Jobs 
WIL2 
1.00 
.95 
- . 2 4 
.97 
WIL3 
1.00 
- . 1 2 
.98 
Max. 
184.0 
70.0 
80.0 
17.0 
336.0 
Mean 
107.02 
26.29 
36.21 
4.07 
173.36 
.639 
.140 
.195 
.028 
Correlation Matrices 
WIL4 
1.00 
- . 1 0 
WILl 
1.00 
.97 
.95 
.04 
.99 
Female (N 
Std. Dev. 
36.01 
17.78 
23.61 
5.87 
77.01 
= 41) 
Min. 
61.0 
8.0 
11.0 
0.0 
91.0 
Female Jobs 
WIL2 
1.00 
.98 
.05 
.99 
WIL3 
1.00 
.04 
.98 
Max. 
212.0 
92.0 
122.0 
17.0 
437.0 
WIL4 
1.00 
.11 
Sources: Authors' calculations from data in Norman D. Willis and Associates 1980. 
Notes: WILl = knowledge and skill points; WIL2 = mental demand points; WIL3 = accountability points; 
WIL4 = working condition points; WILT = total Willis points; WILJF = share of category j points in total 
Willis points. 
Table 10.10 Estimated Comparable Worth Salary Equations, Connecticut Data (absolute value t-statistics) 
(1) 
Male equations (N = 43) 
C 
WILT 
WILl 
WIL2 
WIL3 
WIL4 
WIL5 
R-2 
7892.191 (9.8) 
32.916 (8.6) 
.637 
Female equations (N = 41) 
C 
WILT 
WILl 
WIL2 
WIL3 
WIL4 
WIL5 
R-2 
7379.954 (18.3) 
24.722 (11.6) 
.769 
Annual Salary 
(2) 
7915.740(5.1) 
58.011 (2.4) 
22.515 (0.4) 
-2.513 (0.1) 
-108.585 (2.7) 
.732 
6851.129 (6.2) 
34.716 (1.8) 
34.403 (0.6) 
2.142(0.1) 
28.755 (1.0) 
.756 
(3) 
9370.069 (12.0) 
-116.299 (3.1) 
31.590(9.7) 
.737 
7350.930 (17.7) 
28.938 (1.0) 
24.756(11.4) 
.765 
(4) 
910.953 (169.9) 
.226 (8.9) 
.653 
900.923 (259.1) 
.196 (10.7) 
.738 
Log of Salary8 
(5) 
909.185 (89.5) 
.427 (2.7) 
.051 (0.2) 
.028 (0.1) 
- .736 (2.8) 
.746 
891.796(95.6) 
.369 (2.3) 
.105 (0.2) 
.001 (0.0) 
.195 (0.8) 
.731 
(6) 
920.772 (177.3) 
- .764 (3.1) 
.217 (10.0) 
.748 
900.783 (252.1) 
.191 (0.8) 
.197 (10.5) 
.733 
Source: Norman D. Willis and Associates 1980. 
Notes: C = intercept; WILT = total Willis points; WILl - knowledge and skill points; WIL2 = mental demand points; WIL3 = 
accountability points; WIL4 = working condition points; WIL5 = WILl 4- WIL2 + WIL3. 
aAll coefficients in the log salary equations have been multiplied by 100. The salary figures are for step 4 of the applicable salary 
ranges. 
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Table 10.11 Estimates of Percentage of Comparable Worth Gap for 
Connecticut Data, Alternative Estimation Methods 
D, D2 £>3 D4 D5 £>6 
Mean Percentage Gap -15.4 -15.4 -19 .6 -19.4 -20.2 -19 .3 
Correlation of 
differentials across 
41 female job 
classes 
Z), .98 .79 .84 .79 .84 
D2 .73 .81 .75 .83 
£>3 .98 .98 .95 
D4 .98 .98 
D5 .98 
Notes: The differentials are computed for each female job class using the Hay Point 
Scores for the class and the coefficients from the male wage equations in table 10.10. 
Dj uses equation j for j = 1 to 6. 
ignored because most individuals employed in a bargaining unit pre-
sumably receive the same package of benefits, although some benefits 
may vary with seniority and rank. 
Another, possibly important omission is the studies' failure to include 
opportunities for occupational mobility and subsequent wage growth. 
If male workers in government have fewer opportunities for occupa-
tional mobility than female workers, the observed current wage gaps 
of the previous section may merely be compensating wage differentials 
and would not call for any comparable worth adjustments. In contrast, 
if female employees have fewer opportunities for occupational mobility, 
the observed current wage gaps may understate the extent to which 
females are underpaid. 
Testing for gender-related differences in occupational mobility in the 
sector requires longitudinal earnings data and current job evaluation 
scores for a sample of male and female public employees. Such data 
is not readily available. However, it is possible to provide evidence 
that suggests, using data from the !/ioo sample of the 1970 Census of 
Population. We illustrate how this can be done with data from New 
York State. 
The 1970 Census of Population includes information on an individ-
ual's industry and occupation in both 1965 and 1970, his or her 1969 
earnings level, and his or her employment as a state or local government 
worker in 1970. If one assumes that government employees who re-
mained in the same three-digit industry between 1965 and 1970 were 
also government employees in 1965, then we may focus on this group's 
occupational mobility.29 Mean earnings in 1969 by three-digit public 
sector occupation can be constructed from the census data, and then 
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the ratio of 1969 mean earnings in an individual's 1970 occupation to 
1969 mean earnings in an individual's 1965 occupation can be used to 
measure occupational mobility.30 
Table 10.12 presents the results of regressions in which the logarithm 
of this variable is regressed on a dichotomous variable indicating whether 
the individual is a state or a local government worker, the individual's 
age (as of 1975), the logarithm of the 1969 mean earnings in his or her 
1965 occupation (to control for initialjob level), weeks-worked intervals 
for 1969 (as a measure of labor market attachment), and the individual's 
sex. These results suggest that, as defined, occupational mobility is 
lower for state employees than for local employees. The results also 
suggest that occupational mobility declines with age over the relevant 
age range, is lower for individuals initially working in high-earnings 
occupations, and is lower for individuals with weak labor force at-
tachment. Crucially, it is also lower for females than for males.31 
Although our data are crude, this latter result suggests that observed 
male/female earnings differentials for jobs with equal job evaluation 
Table 10.12 Determinants of Relative Occupational Mobility over the 1965-70 
Period for SLG Employees in New York State (absolute value of 
t-statistic) 
RL1 
(1) (2) 
c 
STATE 
AGE 
AGE2 
LM65 
WORK1 
WORK2 
WORK3 
SEX 
R2 
.476(11.9) 
- .013 ( 3.0) 
- .003 ( 2.1) 
.002 ( 1.6) 
-.083(14.5) 
- .019 ( 4.8) 
.044 
.488 (12.1) 
- .013 ( 2.9) 
- .003 ( 2.2) 
.003 ( 1.7) 
-.086(14.9) 
- .023 ( 2.7) 
.012 ( 2.3) 
.009 ( 1.1) 
- .020 ( 4.7) 
.047 
Source: Author ' s calculations from data from the 1/100 sample for New York State of 
the 1970 Census of Population. The analyses are confined to individuals ages 20 to 70 
in 1970, who were SLG employees in both years, and who worked at least 27 weeks in 
1969. Of this group, roughly 16 percent changed three-digit occupations between 1965 
and 1970, so in 84 percent of the cases LR1 takes on the value of zero. 
Notes: N = 4,944 for all equations. AGE2 coefficients have been multiplied by 100. C— 
intercept te rm; STATE—1 = state employee, 0 = local government employee; AGE— 
individual's age; AGE2—age squared; LM65—logarithm of mean earnings of SLG em-
ployees in New York State in 1969 in the individual's 1965 three-digit occupation; WORK1— 
1 = work 2 7 - 3 9 weeks in 1969, 0 = other; WORK2—1 = work 40-47 weeks in 1969, 
0 = other; WORK3—1 = work 48-49 weeks in 1969, 0 = other (omitted category is 
work 50-52 weeks in 1969); SEX—1 = female, 0 = male; LR1—log of the ratio of mean 
earnings of SLG employees in New York State in 1969 in the individual's 1970 three-
digit occupation to mean earnings of SLG employees in 19^9 in the individual's 1965 
three-digit occupation. 
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scores probably are not compensating earnings differentials for better 
female occupational ^mobility prospects. Indeed, these results suggest 
that the male/female comparable worth gap may be larger than has been 
estimated by the analyses in the previous section. As noted above, 
however, precise tests would require much more detailed data.32 
10.5 Employment Adjustments 
As noted in the introduction, CWWA would likely alter at least four 
types of relative prices that public employers face. First, for any given 
function (e.g., police) and within any major occupational group, the 
average wage of female employees would rise relative to the average 
wage of male employees, as some female employees received CWWA. 
Second, across major occupational groups, the average wage of em-
ployees in heavily "female" occupations would rise relative to the 
average wages of employees in heavily "male" occupations, as more 
employees in the former would receive CWWA. Third, across func-
tions, the average wage in heavily female-dominated functions would 
rise relative to the average wage in heavily male-dominated functions, 
as employees in the former would again be more likely to receive 
CWWA. Finally, the average wage of public employees would rise 
relative to the prices of other goods and services. 
To the extent that public employers' employment decisions are sen-
sitive to their employees' wage rates, these changes should lead re-
spectively to the substitution of some male for some female employees 
within a function-occupation group, the substitution of some employ-
ment in male-dominated occupations for some employment in female-
dominated occupations (within a function), the substitution of some 
employment in male-dominated functions for some employment in fe-
male-dominated functions, and a decline in the aggregate level of public 
employment. For all these reasons, CWWA should lead to a decline in 
female employment. 
This section reports our attempts to estimate the extent to which 
some of these adjustments might occur and then to simulate the po-
tential employment effects of a CWWA. Unfortunately, data are not 
currently available to us on a detailed function by occupation by sex 
breakdown, so the estimates discussed typically aggregate employees 
across occupations within a function, or across functions within an 
occupation.33 These types of aggregations make it difficult to estimate 
substitution elasticities. 
Published data permit us to estimate the extent to which the ratio of 
male to female public administration employees varies across standard 
metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs) with the ratio of male to female 
earnings in the industry. Public administration workers are employed 
in executive and legislative offices; general government (not elsewhere 
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classified); justice, public order, and safety; and the administration of 
various government programs. While many government workers are 
employed in these categories, public administration does not include 
a number of governmental functions, such as hospitals and education. 
As a result the category represents less than half of all state and local 
government employment.34 
Table 10.13 presents estimates based on published SMSA-level data 
from the 1970 and 1980 Census of Population volumes. In each case 
the logarithm of the ratio of male to female public administration em-
ployees (LRE) is regressed on the logarithm of the ratio of male public 
administration employees' median earnings to female public adminis-
tration employees' median earnings (LRW), the logarithm of total pub-
lic administration employment (LT), and the logarithm of the ratio of 
the male to female labor force (LRL). The latter two variables are 
included as crude controls for differences in the occupational mix and 
male/female public administration applicant ratio across SMS As. 
Columns (1) and (2) report estimates based on the 1980 data; it is 
not possible to separate federal employees from state and local em-
ployees in these data, and total government figures are used. While as 
expected the sex ratio in the labor force is positively related to the sex 
ratio in government employment, the latter is also positively associated 
with the sex ratio in wages in that year. That is, there is no evidence 
in the 1980 data that higher female wages are associated with lower 
female employment levels. 
In contrast, the 1970 data suggest that the association between male/ 
female employment and wage ratios is negative (col. 3). However, this 
appears to be true primarily for federal employees (col. 4), where a 10 
percent increase in the male/female wage ratio is associated with an 8 
percent decrease in the employment ratio. State and local government 
employees (col. 5) display no such association. 
The difference in results between the 1970 and 1980 data is puzzling. 
One possible explanation is that it is due to different SMSAs being 
included in each year's sample. When the 1980 equations are reesti-
mated on the subsample of 118 SMSAs that appeared in the 1970 sam-
ple, however, one still observes a positive relative wage coefficient (see 
table 10.13, note a). Attempts to appeal to omitted variable bias also 
did not prove fruitful, as when a fixed effects model was estimated 
using data from both years (col. 5), no significant coefficients were 
obtained. 
Independent of the results, these analyses of the published census 
data are unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. They permit only the 
crudest control for differences in the occupational mix across areas. 
They contain no information on the characteristics of male and female 
employees that might affect their relative productivity (e.g., education 
Table 10.13 Male/Female Public Administration Relative Employment Equations: 1970 and 1980 Census of Population, SMSA-Level Data 
(absolute value of t-statistic) 
c 
LRW801 
LRW802 
LRW701 
LRW703 
LRW704 
ALRW1 
LT801 
LT701 
LT703 
LT704 
ALT1 
LRL80 
LRL70 
ALRL 
R2 
N 
LRE801 
(1) 
.201 (0.6) 
.705 (2.3)a 
- .040(1.4) 
.646(1.8) 
.107 
148 
1980 Data 
LRE802 
(2) 
.533 (2.1) 
.819 (2.7)a 
- .051 (2.2) 
.811 (3.1) 
.170 
148 
LRE701 
(3) 
1.352(4.2) 
- .488 (1.8) 
- .075 (2.8) 
.853 (2.8) 
.149 
118 
1970 Data 
LRE703 
(4) 
.686 (2.0) 
- .811 (3.2) 
- .017 (0.6) 
1.260(3.4) 
.135 
118 
LRE704 
(5) 
1.754(4.0) 
- .059(0.1) 
- .114(2.9) 
.278 (0.7) 
.083 
118 
1970 and 1980 Data 
ALRE1 
(6) 
- .448 (4.1) 
^ 
- .229 (0.7) 
.128 (1.2) 
.234 (0.5) 
.021 
118 
Notes: LREy—logarithm of the ratio of male to female public administration employees in the SMSA; /—80 (1980) or 70 (1970); j—1 = all public 
administration employees, 2 = full-year public administration employees, 3 = all federal public administration employees, 4 = all state and local 
public administration employees; LRWU—log of the ratio of male public administration employees' median earnings to female public administration 
employees' median earnings; LTy—log of total public administration employment in the SMSA; LRL,—log of the ratio of the male to female labor 
force in the SMSA; A—1980 value of the variable minus 1970 value of the variable. 
a. When estimation was restricted to the sample of 118 SMSAs that were present in the 1970 data, the LRW801 (LRW802) coefficient fell to .684 
(.600) with a t-statistic of 1.8 (1.7). 
Sources: Author's calculations from data in: 
(1) 1980 Census of Population: Characteristics of the Population: Detailed Population Characteristics (individual state volumes, Tables 120, 231); 
(2) 1972 City and County Data Book (Table 3); 
(3) 1970 Census of Population: Characteristics of the Population: General Social and Economic Characteristics (individual state volumes, Tables 
188, 189). 
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and age) and hence relative employment levels. They do not permit us 
to separate state from local employees. Finally, they cover only a small 
fraction of all state and local government employees. 
Many of these problems can be remedied using individual data from 
the A sample of the 1980 Census of Population—a 5 percent sample 
for each state. We aggregated state employees' data by state and local 
government employees' data by SMSA to get samples of 49 and 177 
observations respectively.35 The data were stratified into education and 
noneducation employees, and within each of these "industries," into 
four occupational groups—professional and managerial employees (oc-
cupation codes 001-199); technical, sales, and administrative support 
employees (o.c. 203-389); service (including protective service) em-
ployees (o.c. 403-69); and all other employees, including crafters, re-
pair persons, laborers, and transportation equipment operators (o.c. 
473-889). 
Suppose that within each of these occupational groups the quantity 
of labor services produced (L) is given by the constant elasticity of 
substitution function: 
(4) L = A[hQM~B + (1 - b)QFF-*]-u*. 
Where QM(QF) is a measure of the quality of males (females) employed 
in the occupation. M{F) is a measure of male (female) employment in 
the occupation and A,B, and 8 are parameters. If the only cost of labor 
is the wage rate, it is well known that cost minimization leads to the 
relative demand equation 
(5) log (MIF) = a0 + a, log (WM/WF) + a2 log (QM/QF), 
where W^WF) is the male (female) wage and a, is an estimate of minus 
the elasticity of substitution between males and females in the 
occupation. 
Table 10.14 presents estimates of this relative demand equation for 
state employees for each of the four occupational groups in education 
and noneducation. Equations are estimated with both relative employ-
ment and relative person hours as the dependent variable. Each equa-
tion includes the logarithm of male to female earnings in the industry-
occupation cell (LR2) and, as proxies for the relative quality of males 
and females in the occupation, the logarithms of the ratio of average 
age (LR4) and average education level (LR5) of males to females in 
the industry-occupation cell. In addition, to control for supply factors, 
some equations include the logarithm of a measure of the overall male/ 
female wage ratio in the state (LZ1) and the logarithm of the male/ 
female labor force ratio in the state (LZ2). We expect the former to be 
negatively and the latter to be positively associated with male/female 
relative employment in the industry-occupational cell. 
Table 10.14 Within-Occupation Relative Employment and Hours Equations: 1980 Census of Population State Employee Data, By 
State (absolute value t-statistics) 
Employment 
LR3 
LR4 
LR5 
R2 
LR3 
LR4 
LR5 
LZl 
LZ2 
R2 
Hours 
LR3 
LR4 
LR5 
R2 
LR3 
LR4 
LR5 
LZl 
LZ2 
R2 
(1) 
.846(1.3) 
- .118(0.1) 
.116(0.1) 
.000 
.823 (1.5) 
- .308(0.3) 
- .761 (0.6) 
-1.284 (1.8)* 
1.628 (3.5)* 
.185 
.803 (1.2) 
.026 (0.0) 
.038 (0.0) 
.000 
.778(1.4) 
- .179(0.1) 
- .959 (0.7) 
-1.359(1.9)* 
1.796(3.8)* 
.201 
Noneducation 
(2) 
.387 (0.9) 
- .154(0.2) 
1.871 (1.6) 
.036 
.224 (0.5) 
- .313(0.5) 
1.267 (1.0) 
.097 (0.1) 
.678 (1.5) 
.076 
.390 (0.7) 
- .031 (0.0) 
2.448 (1.8)* 
.041 
.152 (0.3) 
- .218(0.3) 
1.695 (1.2) 
- .111 (0.1) 
1.010 (2.0)* 
.109 
(3) 
- .383 (0.8) 
.609 (0.8) 
1.605(1.6) 
.000 
- .154(0.3) 
.594 (0.8) 
1.829(2.0)* 
-1.761 (1.8)* 
- .601 (0.9) 
.149 
- .047 (0.0) 
.647 (0.8) 
2.110(1.9)* 
.023 
.164(0.3) 
.669 (0.9) 
2.377 (2.3)* 
-2.013 (1.9)* 
- .438 (0.6) 
.154 
(4) 
- .429(1.3) 
.678 (1.1) 
1.720(2.6)* 
.077 
- .431 (1.3) 
.801 (1.3) 
1.845 (2.8)* 
-2.368 (1.8)* 
1.522 (1.8)* 
.117 
- .660(1.8)* 
1.108 (1.6) 
2.301 (3.2)* 
.141 
- .657 (1.8)* 
1.257 (1.9)* 
2.425 (3.4)* 
-2.758 (2.0)* 
1.560(1.7)* 
.181 
(1) 
1.503 (2.1)* 
1.581 (1.4) 
3.532(1.4) 
.375 
1.393 (2.0)* 
1.740(1.6) 
2.603 (1.0) 
.875 (0.9) 
.622(1.0) 
.420 
1.117 (1.5) 
1.918(1.6) 
4.759(1.8)* 
.355 
.975(1.4) 
2.125 (1.9)* 
3.556(1.4) 
1.113 (1.2) 
.810(1.3) 
.444 
Education 
(2) 
- .584(1.8)* 
- .699(1.2) 
.723 (0.5) 
.129 
- .484(1.5) 
- .673(1.2) 
1.128 (0.9) 
-1.184 (1.3) 
1.127 (2.0)* 
.165 
- .670 (2.2)* 
- .135(0.2) 
1.673 (1.4) 
.088 
- .594 (1.9)* 
- .081 (0.2) 
2.016(1.7)* 
- .801 (0.9) 
.990(1.8)* 
.114 
(3) 
.046(0.1) 
.811 (1.4) 
1.176(1.1) 
.000 
- .014(0.0) 
.796(1.4) 
1.261 (1.2) 
- .066 (0.0) 
.352 (0.4) 
.000 
- .193 (0.4) 
1.218(2.0)* 
.842 (0.7) 
.028 
- .239(0.5) 
1.183 (1.9)* 
.982 (0.8) 
- .490 (0.4) 
.581 (0.7) 
.000 
(4) 
- .615(2.0)* 
1.043 (2.2)* 
- .697 (0.7) 
.120 
- .645 (2.0)*-
1.044(2.1)* 
- .748 (0.7) 
.084 (0.0) 
- .379 (0.4) 
.081 
-1.108(2.6)* 
1.891 (3.0)* 
-1.212(0.8) 
.221 
-1.015 (2.3)* 
1.905 (3.0)* 
-1.310(0.9) 
-1.614 (0.7) 
.825 (0.6) 
.195 
Notes: (1) = professional and managerial employees; (2) = technical, sales and administrative support employees; (3) = service (including 
protective service) employees; (4) = other (including crafters, repairpersons, laborers, and transportation equipment operators) employees. 
LR3 = log of the ratio of average hourly earnings of male employees in the category to average hourly earnings of female employees in the 
category; LR4 = log of the ratio of the average age of males to the average age of females in the category; LR5 = log of the ratio of average 
education level of males to the average education level of females in the category; LZl = log of the ratio of male mean weekly earnings of 
full-year full-time workers in the state to female mean weekly earnings of full-year full-time workers in the state; LZ2 = log of the ratio of 
male civilian labor force in the state to female civilian labor force in the state. 
*Statistically significant different from zero at .05 level; one-tail test. 
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Where significant, the control variables (LR4, LR5, LZ1, LZ2) all 
have the expected sign. Unfortunately, the evidence on the substitut-
ability of males for females is much weaker. For noneducation, when 
relative employment is the dependent variable, there are no significant 
relative wage elasticities. When relative person hours (which probably 
is preferable) is used, male/female substitution appears to occur only 
in the "other" category, where a 10 percent increase in the wage ratio 
is associated roughly with a 6.5 percent decrease in the hours ratio. 
Elasticities in this range and larger are observed for state employees 
in education in the technical and administrative support and "other" 
categories. However, here seemingly perverse positive relative wage 
coefficients are found in the professional category. 
Table 10.15 presents estimates of the relative wage coefficients from 
similarly specified equations for local government employees, with 
SMSAs as the units of observation. To avoid errors induced by averages 
constructed from very small samples, the analyses here are restricted 
to SMSAs in which at least four (or eight) individuals of each sex were 
contained in the data for each occupation-industry cell. While it would 
have been preferable to require a larger minimum number of obser-
vations in each cell, the tabulation of the resulting sample sizes from 
these restrictions, which is found at the bottom of table 10.15, suggests 
that even these restrictions substantially reduce the number of obser-
vations available. 
The results in this table are not strongly supportive of the within-
occupation male-female substitution hypothesis. There is some evi-
dence for both education and noneducation that substitution takes place 
among technical and administrative support employees. However, for 
education employees, in some specifications relative wages are posi-
tively associated with relative employment levels for both the profes-
sional and "other" categories. 
Taken together, the results in tables 10.14 and 10.15 are not strongly 
supportive of the hypothesis that within broad occupational groups 
male/female employment ratios are negatively associated with male/ 
female wage ratios. Whether this result reflects the failure of substi-
tution to exist, the presence of heterogeneity due to the use of broad 
occupational categories, or the omission of other important explanatory 
variables is unclear. Unfortunately, sample sizes within cells in these 
data are usually too small to permit tests of substitutability within finer 
occupational groups. 
If one assumes that substitution between males and females is not 
possible within these broad occupational groups, one can aggregate 
across sexes within groups to come up with estimates of the average 
wage paid in each occupation (H>,). The data also permit the computation 
of the share of the payroll paid to each occupational group (S,). One 
Table 10.15 Within-Occupation Relative Employment and Hours Elasticities with Respect to Relative Wages: 1980 Census of 
Population Local Employee Data, by SMSA (absolute value t-statistics) 
Noneducation Education 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Employment 
Aa 
Ab 
Ba 
Bb 
Hours 
Aa 
Ab 
Ba 
Bb 
.089 (0.5) 
.089 (0.5) 
- .091 (0.5) 
- .135 (0.7) 
- .044 (0.2) 
- .044(0.3) 
- .199(1.0) 
- .240(1.3) 
- .296(1.7)* 
- .277(1.7)* 
- .102(0.4) 
.013 (0.0) 
- .239(1.3) 
- .221 (1.3) 
.060 (0.2) 
.175 (0.7) 
.169(0.9) 
.173 (1.0) 
- .015 (0.0) 
- .015 (0.0) 
.155 (0.3) 
.150(0.8) 
- .158(0.5) 
- .159(0.5) 
- .186(0.7) 
- .309(1.1) 
- .185 (0.5) 
- .320 (0.9) 
- .242 (0.9) 
- .382(1.4) 
- .383 (1.0) 
- .512(1.4) 
.856 (2.1)* 
.725 (1.9)* 
.737 (1.9)* 
.606(1.6) 
.535 (1.3) 
.396(1.0) 
.417 (1.0) 
.278 (0.7) 
- .074 (0.2) 
- .095 (0.3) 
- .936(1.8)* 
- .951 (1.8)* 
- .117 (0.4) 
- .134(0.4) 
- .981 (1.9)* 
- .983 (1.8)* 
.057 (0.3) 
.060 (0.4) 
.029(0.1) 
.028 (0.0) 
.116(0.7) 
.116(0.7) 
.097 (0.4) 
.096 (0.3) 
.296 (0.9) 
.273 (0.9) 
1.230(3.0)* 
1.211 (2.2)* 
- .040(0.1) 
- .059 (0.2) 
.957 (2.5)* 
.978 (2.5)* 
Notes: A = confined to SMSAs with more than 4 males and 4 females in the occupation in the data; B = confined to SMSAs with more 
than 8 males and 8 females in the occupation in the data; a = logs of relative age and relative education levels also included in the analysis; 
b = logs of relative age, relative education levels, and male/female labor force ratio included in the analyses. Occupational categories are 
defined as in Table 10.14. The sample sizes are: 
Noneducation Education 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A 168 145 160 85 176 41 149 71 
B 136 95 128 49 175 24 103 41 
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can thus estimate share equations (derived from translog expenditure 
functions) of the form 
4 
(6) Si = 2 au log Wj, i = 1,2,3,4, 
y - i 
to test whether substitution of employees across occupations occurs 
in response to changes in wages in the different occupations.36 
If such substitution occurs, given estimates of how CWWA would 
change the average wage in each occupation, one can then compute 
the resulting changes in factor shares and, holding the total employment 
budget constant, the change in total and female employment in each 
occupation. To these changes, one can add estimates of the employment 
changes caused by the response of the employment budget to the CWWA-
induced change in the average wage in the sector and thus obtain an 
estimate of the overall effect of CWWA on female employment in the 
sector. 
As is well known, the output constant own wage elasticity of demand 
(AZ,) for each occupation is given by 
(7) n, = [ aa + S,-2 - S,]/Sh 
and each of these elasticities should be negative (see Hamermesh 1986). 
In addition, to satisfy the homogeneity property—that a doubling of 
all wages would not alter the share spent on each occupation—it is 
necessary that 
(8) aJl + aJ2 + a,3 + aJ4 = 0 for each7. 
Finally, to satisfy the symmetry property—that the Allen elasticity of 
substitution of occupation / for occupation j be equal to the elasticity 
of occupation j for occupation /—it must be the case that 
(9) au = aji for all 1 ¥> j . 
(See Hamermesh and Grant 1979). The restrictions summarized in 
equations (7) through (9) provide a convenient way of testing if the 
data are consistent with the share equations specified in equation (6). 
Tables 10.16 and 10.17 provide estimates, for the state and local 
government samples respectively, of the occupational share equations 
derived from the translog expenditure function. In each case estimates 
are provided of the unconstrained system, of the system with homo-
geneity imposed, and of the system with both homogeneity and sym-
metry imposed. Since the four occupational shares must sum to unity, 
the coefficients of any wage variable must sum across equations in each 
system to zero. Hence, we infer the value of the coefficients of the last 
equation from estimates of the first three. The estimates are obtained 
Table 10.16 Estimates of State Government Translog Cost Functions for State Major Occupation Group Data: Instrumental Variables 
(absolute value t-statistics) 
LW1 
I. No restrictions 
SI .196(0.7) 
S2 - .005 (0.0) 
S3 - .136(1.0) 
S4 - .054 
II. Homogeneity 
SI - .088(0.5) 
S2 .052 (0.4) 
S3 .027 (0 3) 
S4 .009 
Education (n = 49) 
LW2 
.034(1.8)* 
- .085 (0.7) 
- .201 (2.2)* 
- .065 
.340(1.8)* 
- .085 (0.7) 
- .201 (2.3)* 
- .054 
III. Homogeneity and symmetry 
SI .045 (0.2) 
S2 .061 (0.5) 
S3 - .066(1.0) 
S4 - .039 
.061 (0.5) 
- .004 (0.0) 
- .079(1.3) 
.020 
LW3 
- .183 (1.0) 
.022 (0.2) 
- .204 (2.4)* 
- .043 
- .183 (1.0) 
.022 (0.2) 
.204 (2.4)* 
- .043 
- .066(1.0) 
- .076(1.3) 
.201 (4.1)* 
- .057 
LW4 
- .220(1.0) 
.041 (0.3) 
.056 (0.6) 
.123 
- .068 (0.3) 
.010 (0.8) 
- .030 (0.4) 
.088 
- .039 (0.8) 
.202 (0.5) 
- .057(1.7)* 
.076 
LW1 
- .277(0.1) 
.212 (0.5) 
.549 (0.4) 
- .484 
.934 (0.9) 
- .012(0.1) 
- .408 (0.6) 
- .538 
- .039(0.1) 
- .138 (0.7) 
.052 (0.2) 
.126 
Noneducation (n = 49) 
LW2 
-1.802(1.5) 
.179(0.6) 
1.209(1.2) 
.596 
-1.142(1.2) 
.056 (0.3) 
.506 (0.8) 
.580 
- .138 (0.7) 
.122(0.7) 
.017(0.1) 
- .001 
LW3 
1.367(0.7) 
- .184(0.4) 
- .922 (0.6) 
- .261 
- .224 (0.5) 
.112(1.0) 
.336(1.0) 
- .224 
.052 (0.2) 
.017(0.1) 
.175(1.0) 
- .243 
LW4 
- .067 (0.0) 
-.062(10.3) 
- .038 (0.0) 
.167 
.432 (0.7) 
- .155(1.1) 
- .434(1.0) 
- .157 
.126(0.8) 
- .001 (0.1) 
- .243 (2.1)* 
.118 
Notes: SI = share of payroll spent on professional and managerial employees; S2 = share of payroll spent on technical, sales, and administrative 
support employees; S3 = share of payroll spent on service employees; S4 = share of payroll spent on all other employees. 
LW1 = logarithm of the average hourly wage in category 1. Estimates in the S4 rows are implied by the adding up property. 
F Tests Education Noneducation 
HO 
II 
III 
HA 
I 
I 
F(3,132) = 
F(6,132) = 
1.46 
1.72 
F(3,132) = 
F(6,132) = 
= 0.57 
= 1.70 
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277 Comparable Worth in the Public Sector 
using an instrument for each of the wage variables and an estimation 
method that takes account of the correlation of the error terms across 
equations.37 
These estimates provide mixed support for the translog specification. 
On the one hand, in three of the four systems (education/state, nonedu-
cation/state, education/local) one cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
homogeneity and symmetry restrictions (equations 8 and 9) are satis-
fied. On the other hand, the majority of the individual regression coef-
ficients are statistically insignificantly different from zero in all of the 
systems estimated. One senses that this contributes to the above re-
sults. Moreover, the own-wage elasticities of demand they imply when 
symmetry and homogeneity are imposed (table 10.18) are negative in 
only nine of the sixteen cases. 
The mixed nature of these results suggest that one should take pre-
dictions they generate with a grain of salt. Nonetheless they can be 
used, along with knowledge of the share of expenditures on each cat-
egory, the proportion of hours worked by females in each category, 
the male and female wages in each category, female employment in 
each category, and an assumption about what CWWA would do to 
female wages, to generate predictions about the effect of CWWA on 
female employment due to substitution away from female-dominated 
occupations, holding the total employment budget constant. The ap-
pendix sketches somewhat formally how this is done. Illustrative sim-
ulations appear in table 10.19, where we have assumed CWWA would 
raise the wage of all female employees by 20 percent.38 
Although the implied percentage changes in female employment in 
each occupation varies across industry (education or noneducation) 
and sector (state or local), the implied average change in overall female 
employment is remarkably similar across industry and sector. The 20 
percent CWWA is predicted to reduce female employment in education 
Table 10.18 Estimates of Own-Wage Elasticities of Demand for State and Local 
Government Employees by Occupation (mean share of payroll) 
Professional et al. 
Technical et al. 
Service 
Other 
State Government 
Education 
- . 207 (.731) 
- . 880 (.147) 
1.593* (.080) 
.850 (.042) 
Noneducation 
- .633 (.453) 
- .276 (.267) 
.303 (.152) 
.050 (.128) 
Local Government 
Education Noneducation 
- .816* (.820) - .791 (.280) 
- .961 (.068) .961 (.205) 
-1.191 (.078) .750(301) 
.005 (.034) - .757 (.214) 
Notes: Derived from own-wage coefficients in tables 10.16 and 10.17 (homogeneity and 
symmetry constrained specifications), mean share of payroll spent on the category, and 
equation (7) in the text. 
"Estimated based on statistically significant regression coefficient. 
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Table 10.19 Implied Percentage Effects of a 20 Percent CWWA for All Females 
on the Employment of Females in State and Local Governments 
Due to Occupational Substitution, Total Employment Budget Held 
Constant 
State Employees Local Employees 
Education Noneducation Education Noneducation 
Mean percentage 
change in female 
employment in 
Professional - 6 . 2 
Technical and support - 4 . 9 
Service - 6.0 
Other - 7 . 4 
Overall - 5 . 9 
Minimum change —4.3 
observation 
Maximum change - 9 . 3 
observation 
Source: Authors' calculations using the method described in the appendix, the coefficients 
from the homogeneity and symmetry constrained regressions reported in tables 10.16 
and 10.17, and the underlying census data. 
by almost 6 percent and female employment in noneducation by about 
5.5 percent. These figures are the averages for all observations in the 
sample; as the bottom rows of the table suggest, the predicted losses 
vary across observations, with the range of predicted losses being larger 
for local government employees. 
We must stress, however, that these simulations assume that the total 
employment budget remains constant in the face of the CWWA. This 
is roughly equivalent to assuming that in the aggregate the wage elas-
ticity of demand for state and local government employees is unity. 
That is, they assume that any given increase in the average wage of 
state and local government employees would result in an equal per-
centage decrease in aggregate state and local government employment. 
In fact, studies of the aggregate (by function) wage elasticity of de-
mand for state and local government employees typically find wage 
elasticities of demand that are less than unity.39 Thus, an increase in 
the average wage would increase the total employment budget; the 
calculations in table 10.19 therefore overstate the decline in female 
employment that would occur. 
Some idea of the magnitude of the overstatement can be obtained 
from the following crude calculations. Based on knowledge of the ratios 
of male to female wages and of male to female hours in each industry/ 
sector, we calculate that a 20 percent increase in wages for females 
would increase the average wages of state education, state nonedu-
- 8 . 7 
- 6 . 8 
2.8 
2.6 
- 5 . 5 
- 3 . 3 
- 7 . 1 
-15 .6 
21.5 
14.4 
10.4 
- 5 . 9 
- 1 . 3 
-12 .1 
-12.5 
- 3 . 9 
- 2 . 2 
5.5 
- 5 . 4 
0.1 
-11.9 
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cation, local education, and local noneducation employees by about 8 
percent, 7.5 percent, 11.5 percent, and 5.5 percent, respectively.40 It 
is reasonable to take — .5 as a "best" estimate of the aggregate wage 
elasticity of demand for noneducational employees in the state and 
local sector and — .75 as the comparable estimate for educational em-
ployees (Ehrenberg and Schwarz 1986, table 3). These elasticities imply 
employment budget increases for state education, state noneducation, 
local education, and local noneducation, respectively, of 2 percent, 
3.75 percent, 2.9 percent, and 2.75 percent. Such increases would re-
duce the female employment declines predicted by table 10.13 by roughly 
half. 
In sum, our simulations suggest that the decline in female employ-
ment caused by a 20 percent CWWA for all female employees in the 
state and local sector would be quite small, probably falling in the range 
of 2 percent to 3 percent. These somewhat surprisingly small estimates 
are a direct result of our inability to find much substitutability of males 
for females within major occupational groups, or much substitutability 
across major occupational groups as relative wages change.41 
10.6 Concluding Remarks 
At the theoretical level, we conclude that the case for comparable 
worth rests on the argument that the current distribution of female 
employees is based on discriminatory barriers which existing legislation 
have not broken down. If this argument is valid, the desirability of 
comparable worth depends upon one's perceptions of how the benefits 
it provides contrasts with the efficiency losses it induces. Given the 
trade-offs involved, ultimately one's position on comparable worth 
must depend on value judgments. 
Turning to the public sector, our empirical analyses in section 10.3 
suggest that existing estimates of comparable worth wage gaps in the 
states of Connecticut, Minnesota, and Washington are relatively in-
sensitive to the functional form of the earnings equation estimated and 
to whether total job points are decomposed into their individual factor 
point scores. While these results should be gratifying to proponents of 
comparable worth, we stress the need to perform sensitivity analyses 
of the type we have undertaken for studies of other governmental units 
in the future. These results are based on job evaluation systems (Hay 
or Willis) that purport to measure four distinct characteristics of jobs; 
in the case of the Hay system, these are know-how, problem solving, 
accountability, and working conditions. As described in section 10.3, 
the latter characteristic is obviously measured with substantial error 
and the first three are so highly correlated that it is unlikely they capture 
more than one dimension of a job. As a result, we must be skeptical 
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about what these job evaluation systems are actually measuring. If job 
evaluation systems are to be used in comparable worth studies, we 
suggest that more thought be given to their design. 
Our analyses in section 10.4 call attention to the need to focus on 
forms of compensation in addition to current wages and working con-
ditions in judging the "total" compensation of a job. In particular, we 
stressed the need for longitudinal earnings data for individuals initially 
in each job category to test if observed occupational wage differentials 
are partially compensating differentials for different opportunities for 
occupational mobility. 
Finally, our analyses in section 10.5 find little evidence that intraoc-
cupational male/female employment ratios in the SLG sector are sen-
sitive to intraoccupational male/female wage ratios or that the SLG 
occupational distribution of employment is sensitive to the SLG oc-
cupational distribution of wages. These results imply, in our simula-
tions, that the decline in female employment caused by a CWWA for 
all female SLG employees would be surprisingly small. Indeed, we 
estimate that a 20 percent CWWA for all SLG female employees would 
lead to only a 2 percent to 3 percent decline in female employment. 
Opponents of comparable worth might claim these estimates are 
much too low and point to problems in our empirical analyses. These 
problems include using broad definitions of occupations (only four), 
aggregating all noneducation employees into one group, aggregating all 
governmental units in an SMSA together, basing analyses often on small 
sample sizes, and using wage variables that are subject to considerable 
measurement error. Our analyses were dictated by the nature of the 
census data we used, and we hope to undertake analyses in the future 
of other data bases (see n. 33) that would provide larger sample sizes, 
greater functional breakdowns, and data at the individual governmental 
level. Moreover, now that several states have begun to adopt compa-
rable worth, the employment effects of the policy may be directly 
inferred after a few years from their experiences. However, while our 
personal priors were that we would find larger estimates of potential 
job loss for females, it seems reasonable at least temporarily to take 
our current findings at face value. 
We should stress, however, that a CWWA policy would have addi-
tional repercussions. Some males in the sector would also lose their 
jobs, and if these displaced males and females sought employment in 
the private sector, downward pressure would be placed on wages there. 
Indeed, if a CWWA policy were confined to the public sector, it is not 
obvious that women as a group would benefit; the higher wages for 
women employed in the public sector may be at least partially offset 
by resulting lower wages for women in the private sector. 
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Appendix A 
Table 10.A.1 
Sample 
F Tests to Test Alternative Functional Forms for the Male 
Equations in Various State Data Sets 
Salary Equations Log Salary Equations 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Connecticut 4.32* 11.97* 0.68 4.42* 11.96* 0.89 
Minnesota 2.23 0.00 3.30* 6.57* 0.66 9.50* 
Washington (min.) 1.83 0.01 2.70 1.21 0.05 1.76 
Washington (max.) 2.63 1.48 3.23* 1.30 0.77 1.56 
Washington (ave.) 2.24 0.62 3.02 1.32 0.21 1.84 
Notes: Let DV be the dependent variable and HP represent either Hay or Willis points. 
Remembering that HPT = HP\ + HP! + HP3 + HP4 and HP5 = HP1 + HP1 + 
HP3, the equation estimated in each case is 
DV = a0 + axHPx + a2HP2 + a3HP3 + a4HP4. Then 
(1) Ho: at = a2 = a3 = a4, Ha: no constraints on ait a2, a3, aA; 
(2) Ho: a] = a2 — a3 = a4, Ha: a\ = a2 = a3, a4 free to vary; 
(3) Ho: Oj = a2 = a3, Ha: no constraints on alt a2, a3, a4. 
*Reject the null hypothesis (Ho) in favor of the alternative hypothesis (Ha) at the .05 
level of significance. 
Appendix B 
Estimating Female Employment Losses Caused 
by CWWA Due to Changes in the Occupational 
Mix 
Let WMJ be the wage of males in occupation j , WFJ the wage of females 
in occupation j , and Pj the proportion of hours worked by females in 
the occupation. The average wage in the occupation W, is given by 
(Al) Wj = WMJ{\ - Pj) + WFjPj. 
Differentiating with respect to the female wage and then multiplying 
both sides by the ratio of the female wage to the average wage, one 
obtains 
(A2) (dWjIdW^iWpJWj) = PJWFJ/(PJWFJ + (1 - P])WMJ) 
or 
(A3) %AWj - %AWFJ[PJ/(PJ + (1 - P^WMJWPJ))}. 
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If CWWA lead to the same percentage increase in female wages in 
each occupation c, then the percentage change they induce in the av-
erage wage in occupation j is 
(A4) %AWj ~ CPJ/(PJ + (1 - Pj)(WMJ/WFj)). 
Now from the translog cost function share equation (6) in the text, 
(A5) dSt = E atjd log Wj * 2 av(%^Wj). 
7=1 7=1 
The share of expenditures spent on each occupational category is 
given by 
(A6) St = WJE&WJEJ, 
7 = 1 
where employment in each occupation, Ej, is measured in person hours. 
If we hold the total employment budget (the denominator of A6) con-
stant, taking the logarithm of both sides and then the total differential, 
one obtains 
(A7) (VSddSi = d log St = d log W( + d log E, - %AW,- + %t£t. 
One can substitute equation (A5) into equation (A7) and solve for %AE( 
to obtain 
4 
(A8) %l±Ei - [(l/S,-)2>//(%AW;)] - %AW,, 
7 = 1 
Equations (A4) and (A8) together yield that predicted percentage change 
in total employment in each occupation induced by the CWWA. 
How would female employment change? Since we have assumed 
(based on the results in tables 10.14 and 10.15) that CWWA would lead 
to no male-female substitution within an occupation, female employ-
ment would change in each occupation by the same percentage as total 
employment. As a result, if EFj is the initial level of female employment 
in occupation j (measured in hours), the overall percentage effect on 
female employment due to the changing occupational mix (%AEF) is 
given by 
(A9) %AEF = 2(%AEj)EFj/tEFj. 
7 = 1 7 = 1 
283 Comparable Worth in the Public Sector 
Notes 
We are grateful to Daniel Sherman and Richard Chaykowski for their research 
assistance and to Eileen Driscoll and Ann Gerken for their assistance in ob-
taining and manipulating the Census of Population files used in the paper. 
Without implicating them for what remains, we are grateful to numerous col-
leagues at Cornell and the NBER and to Mark Killings worth, Sharon Smith, 
and Helen Remick for their comments on an earlier draft. Our specific debts 
to other individuals are acknowledged throughout the chapter. 
1. This statement is attributed in a number of places to former EEOC chair 
Eleanor Holmes Norton. 
2. Explanations for this occurrence include the following: public decision 
makers are more likely to be swayed by public opinion calling for such policies 
than are private profit-maximizing firms; and increases in female wages in the 
public sector caused by comparable worth wage adjustments are likely to lead 
to only small employment losses because the demand for public employees is 
likely to be inelastic. Empirical evidence for Australia, where a similar policy 
was implemented, provides some support for the latter claim (see Gregory and 
Duncan 1981); see section 10.5 for evidence we offer for the United States. 
3. Tables 10.1 and 10.2 and the next two paragraphs draw heavily on research 
being conducted by our colleague Alice Cook. We are grateful to Cook for 
sharing her materials with us; she is not responsible for our interpretations of 
them. For earlier evidence on the spread of comparable worth in the state and 
local sector, see Cook 1983 and National Committee on Pay Equity 1984. 
4. In AFSCME v. State of Washington. This order was subsequently over-
turned by a federal court of appeals; the state and the union then entered into 
a voluntary agreement in February 1986 to begin to implement comparable 
worth effective April 1, 1986. 
5. While our empirical analyses focus on the state and local sector, there is 
considerable interest in the federal sector as well. Hearings on comparable 
worth have been conducted by several congressional committees, for example, 
U.S. House of Representatives 1982. 
6. See Bergmann 1984 and Killingsworth 1984a, 1984b, and 1984c, respec-
tively, for more complete analytical treatments of the cases for and against 
comparable worth. 
7. That job evaluation scores must be reconsidered as internal and external 
conditions change has long been recognized by institutional economists. For 
a recent discussion, see Schwab 1984. 
8. Another possible efficiency loss is the reduced incentive females would 
have to obtain training for the higher-paying "male" occupations, since in-
creasing the wage in "female" occupations via comparable worth wage ad-
justments reduces the return to training investments. 
9. See Ehrenberg and Schwarz 1986, for citations to the literature. 
10. This point has been made by Killingsworth 1984c. 
11. Another remedy would be lump sum payments specified as a function 
of years of service in the occupation. This remedy would have the advantage 
of making its size a function of the magnitude of the loss and would not reduce 
employment of women in the occupation. 
12. See Treiman 1979 for a discussion of current job evaluation schemes. 
13. These are defined as follows: "Know How is the sum total of every kind 
of skill; however acquired, needed for acceptable job performance"; "Problem 
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Solving is the original 'self-starting' thinking required by the job for analyzing, 
evaluating, creating, reasoning, arriving at, and making conclusions"; "Ac-
countability is the answerability for an action and for the consequences thereof"; 
"Working Conditions are made up of physical effort, environment and haz-
ards." See Treiman 1979, 161-65 for elaborations of these definitions and 
copies of the Hay System Guide Charts for assigning points for each of the 
factors. 
14. Others have suggested similar approaches, for example, Treiman and 
Hartmann 1981 and Pierson, Koziara, and Johannesson 1984. Some, however, 
resist any determination of factor weights that use existing wage scale data, 
arguing that these weights will reflect the net effects of any market discrimi-
nation that exists. See, for example, R. C. Blumrosen 1979. 
15. The discussion in this paragraph comes from a November 10, 1983, 
telephone conversation with James Lee of the Minnesota Department of Em-
ployee Relations and from an August 6, 1984, letter from Helen Remick. 
16. Council on the Economic Status of Women 1982, Appendix I. While only 
maximum salary data were available for Minnesota, results we report below 
for the state of Washington suggest that the use of average or minimum wage 
scale data would not appreciably change the results. 
17. Eleven of the titles in the original study did not appear in the latter list. 
Twenty-seven others were either upgraded or downgraded so that the total 
Hay Point Scores for the title did not match on the two data sources. It is 
interesting to note that the male job titles were much more likely to be upgraded 
than female titles (11.5 percent versus 3.5 percent). This may reflect systematic 
errors that led to the undergrading of male jobs in the original evaluations or 
systematic attempts to overgrade male jobs to protect customary wage differ-
entials in the latter. Without further information one cannot conclude whether 
either hypothesis is correct. 
18. The Hay Point System used in Minnesota assigns working condition 
points only to non-exempt jobs and defines most clerical jobs as having normal 
working conditions (and therefore zero working condition points). This is an 
example of how existing job evaluation plans may be sex biased and leads one 
to consider how systematic sex-based measurement errors might influence 
estimates of comparable worth wage gaps. Schwab and Wichern 1983 addresses 
this issue and discusses the usefulness of reverse regression methods in as-
certaining if such measurement errors exist. 
19. That compensable factors in factor point systems are often redundant 
has long been recognized. See Schwab 1984 for citations to the literature. That 
the Hay Point System (in these data) leads in actuality to only two factors, at 
least one of which is subject to considerable measurement error, is probably 
less well known. 
20. Somewhat strikingly, adding the percentage of female employees in an 
occupation (FEM) to either the male or female wage equations results in that 
variable's having a negative coefficient (cols, la, 4a). Even in female-dominated 
occupations, an increase in the female share of employment leads to lower 
wages. 
21. See Remick 1980 and 1984, for a more complete discussion of the Wash-
ington study. 
22. See Remick 1980 for a discussion of the Willis system. 
23. Percentage of females in the occupation was not available in these data. 
24. The unweighted mean is used here because occupational employment 
levels were not available. 
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25. The next two paragraphs are drawn from material in Cook 1983, which 
should be consulted for more details. 
26. Salary information was obtained from charts in Willis and Associates 
1980, which plotted annual compensation versus total Hay points for broad 
job families. Since compensation was rounded to the nearest $200 there, it is 
not surprising that the R2 in table 10.10 are smaller than the comparable ones 
in tables 10.4 and 10.7. In several cases where a male and a female job (a) 
were in the same job family, (b) had identical Willis points, and (c) paid different 
salaries, it proved impossible for us to assign the salaries to each job. As a 
result, six male and six female jobs in the original survey were excluded from 
our sample. 
27. Formal F tests of whether the implicit weights on each factor differ in 
the male wage equations are found in table 10.A. 1 for all three states. 
28. A study that does this for a sample of job titles in Michigan, as well as 
contrasting the results of two different job evaluation methods, is Young, n.d. 
Treiman 1984 has stressed that factor weights can have substantial effects on 
the rankings of jobs if the factors are not highly correlated. 
29. This creates obvious selection bias problems because we are ignoring 
the opportunity for mobility out of the government sector. 
30. While the three-digit census occupation breakdown is the most detailed 
one available in the data, its categories are actually quite broad. In our sample 
only 16 percent of the individuals changed occupations over the five-year 
period. 
31. Given our knowledge of the relative steepness of male and female age-
earnings profiles in the population, this result is not unexpected. 
32. Another nonwage factor that may be important is turnover costs. If two 
job titles rated to be of comparable worth required the same firm-specific 
training investments, but turnover was higher in the first position, employers 
would necessarily pay lower wages to employees in that job title. Testing to 
see if this was a contributing factor to estimated comparable worth wage gaps 
requires data on quit rates by job title. One must be cautious in drawing 
inferences here; as is well known, low wages also lead to higher quits, which 
makes it difficult to infer the direction of causation. 
33. We currently are negotiating with the EEOC for more detailed data 
on a function/occupation/sex breakdown and hope to use these data in later 
work. 
34. Only 27 percent of the government employees in the New York data used 
in section 10.4 were employed in public administration. 
35. The A sample contains data for fifty states and 180 SMSAs. At the time 
these analyses were undertaken, however, the data tape for Colorado (and its 
3 SMSAs) was not available at Cornell. 
36. Implicit in this formulation is the notion that public sector decision makers 
have well-defined utility functions that depend on the per capita employment 
levels of various categories of public employees and that the parameters of 
these functions do not vary systematically across areas with public employee 
wages. For discussions of this approach and analyses that use functional rather 
than occupational data, see Ashenfelter and Ehrenberg 1975 and Ehrenberg 
1973. 
37. The need for instrumental variables can be illustrated in the two-occupation 
case. Let M,(F,) be the number of male (female) hours employed in occupation 
/ and WMi(WFi) the wage rate of males (females) in occupation /. Then the 
shares (£,) and average wages (W,-) in the two occupations are given by 
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Si = (WmM{ + WFlFl)KWmM1 + WFlFt + WM2M2 + W^Ffr, 
S2 = (WmM2 + WF2F2)KWmMi + WFlF, + WM2M2 + W^FJ; 
W, = {WmM, + WFlFl)/(M1 + F,); 
W2 = (WmM2 + WF2F2)/(M2 + F2). 
It is obvious that each 5, is positively correlated with its own wage rate and 
negatively correlated with the other wage rate; these correlations would bias 
the coefficient estimates of equation (6). 
To remove these mechanical correlations, instruments for the occupational 
wage rates are created by regressing these wage rates on median income in 
the area, area population, male and female wages in the area (state data only), 
and mean ages and education levels of males and females in the occupation. 
The system is then estimated using the 3SLS option in SAS. 
38. This figure is consistent with the comparable worth wage gap estimates 
presented in section 10.3 for Connecticut, Minnesota, and Washington. A lower 
figure would yield proportionately lower employment loss estimates. 
39. See Ehrenberg and Schwarz, 1986, table 3, for a summary of the results 
from all these studies. 
40. These are crude calculations that ignore the interoccupational substitution 
that would take place. 
41. We should stress that these simulations also ignore the possibility that 
CWWA may increase the attractiveness of "female" occupations to males and 
reduce the extent to which females are excluded from "male" occupations 
(since the wage advantage in "male" jobs would no longer exist). These factors 
would create additional, conflicting, pressures on female employment levels. 
They also ignore any effects of the increased total public sector employment 
budget on private sector employment levels. 
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